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FOREWORD 
 
The report presented is a following up of a more extensive report in Norwegian 
found in Lundesgaard (2014). The reports both address the same sort of problem. 
The present report is a considerably shortened version in English. 
 
                                                                                                                  J.L. 
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IAS 19 and Employee Benefits: Some 
Reflections on the Norwegian Experience 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Employee benefit plans lead to future obligations believed to have the character 
of corporate liabilities. Plan assets held separate from the corporate sponsor 
raise the question of the funded status of the plan. Since the beginning of the 
1980s, the policy of accounting standard setting has been that effects of this has 
to be included in financial statements, and that details behind what is included 
are reported in notes. However, this is one of two alternatives in making effects 
visible. First, elements are included in financial statements/reports as stated by 
standard setters. Second, information on effects of employee benefit plans is 
limited to notes. This problem, and the reflections it leads to, motivates what is 
offered in this paper. 
 
In Norway, the Norwegian Accounting Act of 1998 regulates financial reporting. 
Norway is not member of the EU, but since 1994 associated through the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA) agreement together with Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
The effect of this is that EU rulings are made effective in Norway, such as EU ac-
counting directives functioning as broader guidelines, in addition to EU regula-
tions with the character of strict statutory law. This starts out with EU Regula-
tion 1606 / 2002. This regulation establishes a private foundation, International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), as the official supplier of strict financial 
accounting regulation in the EU. In Norway, when it comes to financial report-
ing regulation, the situation does not differ that much from that in EU member 
states. Companies which do not report according to international standards 
(International Financial Reporting Standard/IFRS), report according to the 
national accounting act supplemented with national accounting standards 
(NRSs). That is N GAAP. Even if there is some mixing of regimes, financial 
reporting regulation in Norway is presently a double track system consisting of 
two separate and parallel regulatory regimes. The two regimes differ in their 
foundations. IFRS is balance sheet oriented and open to “fair value accounting.” 
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N GAAP is income statement oriented in that matching of revenue earned with 
related expenses is fundamental, and transaction historic cost (THC) based.  
 
In forming N GAAP, the role of the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board 
(NASB) is important. NASB is a private foundation established in 1989. In 
spite of not being a public administrative body, NASB brings into life finan-
cial reporting guidelines with wide reaching consequences. That is, NRSs and 
what come with these standards. The legal authorization for this is found in 
Section 4-6 of the accounting act stating that “[t]he preparation of the annual 
accounts shall be in accordance with good accounting practice”, and the 
understanding is that “good accounting practice” is administered by NASB. 
Simply, as long as accepted by competent law making organs, NASB will con-
tinue to form legal accounting in Norway.  
 
With the introduction of IFRS in Norway, companies that report according to 
international standards are required to follow IAS 19 Employee Benefits. This 
standard is among the “old” standards taken over by the reorganized interna-
tional standard setter. The acronym IAS stands for International Accounting 
Standard, and “new” standards are identified by the acronym IFRS. In the first 
half of the 1980s, IAS 19 and SFAS 87 Employers’ Accounting for Pensions 
administered by the American standard setter Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), were in place. Both standards require that effects of employee 
benefit plans are included in financial statements. In what follows in Norway, 
the history is summarized by a series of episodes or events. 
 
     Around the mid 1990s, first as a preliminary standard, the Nor-
wegian accounting standard NRS 6 Pensjonskostnader (Pension 
Costs) is released by NASB. The standard is drafted in looking to 
IAS 19.  
 
     However, the inclusion of pension effects is not limited to report-
ing entities that report according to the Norwegian Accounting 
Act of 1998 and thus NRS 6. Local governments have to do this 
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too according to an adapted version of NRS 6. This is stated in 
Section 13 Regnskapsføring av pensjon (Pension Accounting) of 
regulations from the Ministry of Local Government and Moder-
nisation (2000). 
 
     The state accounting system is double track. First, a cash-based 
part in parallel to what is found in the state budget system admi-
nistered by the Ministry of Finance. Second, what more recently is 
stated in state accounting standards (SRSs). The SRSs represent 
an accrual-based sorts of system of somewhat preliminary char-
acter. A government agency is administering these standards, see 
Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management 
(2011). SRS 25 Personal- og pensjonskostnader (Personal and 
Pension Costs) is concerned with what is found in NRS 6. 
 
     The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund is a state “pay as you 
go” (PAYG) arrangement. In spite of a state guarantee of what 
comes of employee benefits under the arrangement, institutions 
reporting according to the Norwegian Accounting Act will have to 
follow NRS 6 and include pension effects in their financial state-
ments based on a system with “fictive funds.” 
 
     A special sort of arrangement is the Contractual Early Retirement 
Scheme referred to as AFP (Avtalefestet pensjon). We have an old 
and a new version of AFP, and the new version raises accounting 
questions. The views of NASB (2010) and the Financial Supervi-
sory Authority of Norway (2010) have been that pension effects 
should be included in accordance with NRS 6. Due to opposition 
against this, the Ministry of Finance (2011) came out with a report 
on the problem. In the Autumn of 2013, the Ministry announced 
its intention not to require inclusion of accounting effects of the 
new AFP. 
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Internationally, pension accounting is controversial, or at least discussed. Re-
cently, this led to a new IAS 19 being effective from January 1 2013. In this new 
standard, options are limited and effects come to the balance sheet via the in-
come statement. Whether this will settle unrest around pension accounting is an 
interesting question. In Norway, as we have seen, lots of effort has been spent in 
direction of bringing in pension accounting close to everywhere. This based on 
old versions of IAS 19. Given NASB’s policy of “look to IFRS,” it is not unlikely 
that much of this is going to be redone. 
 
The paper is organized in the following manner. The basics on pensions, and 
employee benefit plans in particular, are outlined in Section 2. The “mechanics” 
of pension accounting are complex, and we are not going all way in this. Never-
theless, this has to be carried sufficiently far, and both Section 3 and Section 4 
are needed for this. Section 5 is important in introducing the “two-process idea.” 
In addition, effects of pension accounting are discussed. Section 6 includes a 
case study. In Section 7, the paper is concluded in advising the standard setter to 
limit reporting on employee benefit plans to notes.  
 
2.  On pension plans  
 
When it comes to the pensions of employees, companies as employers are typi-
cally active in two ways. This leads to two different types of plan regimes. 
 
     First, we have defined contribution plans in which employers con-
tribute to funding of the pension arrangements of employees. 
With the transfer of the agreed on contribution the obligations of 
the employer are settled. 
 
     Second, we have defined benefit plans in which employees are 
guaranteed certain pensions such as some percentage of salary 
earned. Under this sort of plan regime, obligations of the employ-
er are extended to more than just contributing to the plan. 
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In Norway, recently a law on hybrid pensions is passed which will have account-
ing implications. However, to a certain extent, the really interesting implications 
are a result of defined benefit plans. That is what reflections offered are focused 
on. Defined contributions plans are less interesting from an accounting point of 
view.  
 
Before turning to defined benefit plans and accounting, a few words are said 
about differences between regimes. First, the guaranty of benefit plans make 
these arrangements less controllable for the employer, and eventually more 
costly depending on how good the arrangements are for employees. With a con-
tribution plan, employers know what pension expenses are. Second, in a contri-
bution plan, risk is shifted so that risk associated with plan assets are borne by 
the employee/retiree. In Norway, and internationally, the tendency has been in 
direction of contribution plans. Exhibit 1 contributes with a picture of the situ-
ation in the private sector in Norway.  
 
 
 
Exhibit 1: From Veland and Hippe based on FNO (Finans Norge) statistics. 
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It is seen that the number of plans is increased and this has to do with manda-
tory aspects associated with law making in the area of pensions. New plans are 
typically contribution plans. In addition, the number of benefit plans is reduced 
and this is to some extent a result of conversion from benefit to contribution 
plans. In business, defined benefit plans are simply less popular, and this may 
also have something to do with accounting standards, as we will see. In principle 
it is possible to make pension plans equivalent from an expected value point of 
view. However, in going from a benefit plan to a contribution plan employees 
are exposed to uncertainty. In assuming risk aversion, this is something that 
should be compensated for.  
 
Defined benefit plans are funded or unfunded. When unfunded, and no other 
provision is arranged for, the benefits of future retirees are guaranteed by the 
employer’s capacity to meet future obligations. Of course, this adds risk to un-
funded plans. In many countries, the lawmaker restricts the establishment of 
unfunded benefit plans. We may see funding as the normal case, and that is also 
what we look at in what follows. In Exhibit 2, some fundamentals are outlined. 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Some fundamentals of employee benefit plans. 
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There are three parties involved, and in the illustration, cash flows are drawn 
with solid lines. Understandings/agreements are marked with dotted lines. The 
institution responsible for the arrangement is separate from the sponsor and 
normally in charge of administering plan assets. At any time, plan assets have a 
fair value understood as the equivalent to market value. SFAS 157 and IFRS 13 
by the main standard setters regulate the understandings of what fair value is, 
and this is more than just observed marked value. The purpose of plan assets is 
that of building a bridge between contributions and future obligations. Future 
obligations are abstract, calculated constructs having a present value. In under-
standing this present value as a fair value, plan assets and obligations can be 
matched. In matching, the net is a result that represents the funded status of a 
benefit plan. Both under-coverage and over-coverage is a possibility. The inclu-
sion of this in the balance sheet, and what follows with this, is what pension 
accounting is about. Traditionally, in accounting, adding to accounts financial 
information about transactions is essential. Obviously, in adding a net repre-
senting the funded status of a benefit plan as presented, we are doing something 
that is very different.   
 
3.  The “simple mechanics” of benefit plan accounting 
 
The accounting act of 1998 defines what are small companies (Section 1-6). 
With the purpose of easing the burden of reporting, small companies report 
according to a particular set of guidelines. That is, national accounting standard 
NRS 8 God regnskapsskikk for små foretak (Good accounting practice for small 
companies) in which guidelines for pension accounting are stated (pp. 50-54). 
Under conditions specified, small companies may ignore pension accounting 
effects of defined benefit plans. That is, the employer’s contribution to the bene-
fit plan is the sole effect included (as an expense). That is, technically as for de-
fined contribution plans.  
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What are not small companies are other companies, and they report according 
to NRS 6. Exhibit 2 may point in direction of that only the net funded status of a 
defined benefit plan is included in financial statements. However, not only the 
funded status is included, but also a specific pension expense effect, and other 
items. What is included can be seen as summarized items being a result of 
primary, underlying elements. However, first a few words about the dynamics of 
the net funded status.  
 
We are interested in what happens over the reporting period. Stock and flow 
magnitudes are involved, and the funded status of the plan is a net stock mag-
nitude with a beginning (opening) and an ending balance. The opening balance 
of the net funded status is either a liability (under-coverage) or an asset (over-
coverage). Consequently, the net of increments in plan assets and projected 
benefit obligations may be an incremental liability (incremental under-cover-
age), or an incremental asset (incremental over-coverage). The combinations of 
this are outlined in Exhibit 3. 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Combinations of opening balances and net increment effects. 
 
Case 1 and Case 4 end up with more of what is started out with. What the ending 
balance will be for Case 2 and Case 3 is less clear. In Case 2, the opening under-
coverage is reduced, or eventually is eliminated/more than eliminated (ending 
up with over-coverage). In Case 3, opening over-coverage is reduced, or elimi-
nated / more than eliminated. Obviously, plan assets that “lag behind” are neces-
Under-   
coverage
Over-    
coverage
Under-   
coverage
Case 1 Case 2
Over-     
coverage    
Case 3 Case 4
Over the period type of effect:Opening 
balance - net 
funded status:
 - 9 - 
 
 
 
 
 
sarily not what always is the case. How this all works together is related to more 
demanding questions about the built up and administration of plan assets, this 
on one hand. On the other hand we have everything of elements that contributes 
to the determination of projected benefit obligations. Seemingly, what should be 
aimed at is keeping plan assets and projected benefit obligations reasonably at 
par. 
 
Even if what is aimed at is keeping assets and obligations more strictly at par, it 
is less likely that they will end up at par from period to period. This is due to 
uncertainty associated with the problem, and uncertainty is present in both 
benefit plan assets and projected benefit obligations. A point of view forwarded 
is that the uncertainty pointed to is a minor problem due to that it will even out 
over time. This sounds fine, but it is nonetheless so that it is not unimportant 
whether magnitudes are smaller or bigger. In addition, we have the question of 
how long it takes to even out. Moreover, the situation could be that of magni-
tudes that swing back and forth, without coming to rest in evening out.  
 
In what is essential in the guidelines, the status of a benefit plan as under-cover-
age, or over-coverage, is brought to the balance sheet. Under-coverage leads to a 
liability that reduces the owner’s equity. Over-coverage brings in an added asset 
so that the owner’s equity is increased. For first-time adopters of NRS 6 this is 
what is the effect, and these are the “simple mechanics.” The “not that simple 
mechanics” include increments, and so primary, underlying elements play a 
more explicit role.  
 
4.  The “not that simple mechanics” 
 
“Not that simple mechanics” of pension accounting is what is a practical reality 
for preparers and users of accounting information. It is said that pension ac-
counting is complex and difficult to understand. It is not our intention to lay out 
in full breath the intricacies of pension accounting being a consequence of con-
ceptual and legal complexities (NRS 6, and what comes with it, is approaching 
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hundred pages). In this, we have the technical complexities associated with 
some primary, underlying elements. Hence, it is our intension to simplify in still 
being relevant. In this section, the text presented comes in two rounds. First, 
what is included in the income statement is discussed. Second, a fuller picture of 
primary, underlying elements is introduced.  
 
Pension expenses end up in the income statement. However, to begin with let us 
be somewhat vague about what is included in pension expenses. In addition, we 
have an incremental item so far referred to as “Eventual other elements.” With 
this, in seeing the opening balance of the funded status as a liability at its abso-
lute value (in Exhibit 4 it is seen that the sign of this liability is negative), we 
have the following: 
 
    OPENING BALANCE FUNDED STATUS 
– EMPLOYER’S CONTRIBUTION  
+ PENSION EXPENSE 
+/– “EVENTUAL OTHER ELEMENTS” 
--------------------------------------------- 
= ENDING BALANCE FUNDED STATUS 
============================= 
 
The three incremental items above summarize to what in Exhibit 3 is referred to 
as “[o]ver the period type of effect.” It is registered that this is more than the dif-
ference between pension expenses and the employer’s contribution, which as a 
net increment can be plus or minus. Added to this is what so far is called “Even-
tual other elements.” If this has to do with uncertainty, and revised best ac-
counting estimates, Section 4-2 of the accounting act applies. This section states 
the following: 
 
In the event of uncertainty, the best estimate shall be applied, based on 
the information available when the annual accounts are prepared. 
 
When accounting estimates are revised, the effect shall be recognised 
in the income statement in the period in which the estimate is revised, 
unless good accounting practice allows for the effect to be deferred. 
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This leads us to three observations. 
 
     First, we have what is stated above to begin with in part two of 
Section 4-2. The effect of revised accounting estimates “shall” end 
up in the income statement. However, the second part after the 
comma opens for “can” of something else, and that is what is in 
NRS 6.  
 
     Second, NRS 6 opens for that the effects of revised estimates of 
defined benefit plans can bypass the income statement and end 
up directly in the balance sheet.   
 
     Third, for certain conditions fulfilled, NRS 6 opens for that the 
alternative above can be combined with deferred recognition.  
 
The inclusions of accounting estimates in financial statements brings along 
uncertainty associated with such estimates. In itself this is not of good, but it is 
traded off with the informative value of estimates. Employee benefit pension ac-
counting means including “a package” which includes accounting estimates that 
under circumstances have major effects when revised. This leads to that the 
question of smoothing is raised. In facing this, the second and third points 
above can be seen as smoothing devices. 
 
Now, we turn to the primary, underlying elements and how they are summari-
zed. In including all necessary practical details, this is messy problem, and for 
our purpose this is less meaningful. Thus, a simplified version is presented. 
First, we are going exclude the effects of payroll tax. Second, any sort of effect 
that has to do with administrative costs is left un-discussed. Third, we see end-
ing plan assets as fully known, and not as an estimate revised when fully known. 
That is, net earnings on investment are seen as fully known. Forth, details as to 
plan amendments are not dealt with. In Exhibit 4, a bird’s view is offered.  
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Exhibit 4: Included items and primary, underlying elements. 
 
In the illustration, we have four summarized items. That is, plan assets, project-
ed benefit obligations, pension expense, and funded status (over-/under-cov-
erage). In what follows, the text is so organized that the items mentioned func-
tion as headings. 
 
Plan assets  These are means of the arrangement set aside separate from the 
sponsor (employer), and their administration is regulated by law. Element (a) 
Net earnings on investment, contributes to an increase, and so do (b) and (c) 
being the contributions of the employer and of employees. The purpose of the 
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arrangement, (d) Distribution to retirees, contributes to a reduction. It is regist-
ered that (d) at the same time leads to that projected benefit obligations are 
reduced.  
 
Projected benefit obligations  As pointed to, (d) evens out between the first 
two summary items. (e) Service cost is the present value of retirement benefits 
earned by employees over the period. The calculation of this cost is based on a 
series of factors of actuarial and economic character. Projected benefit obliga-
tions are over the period, such as a year, coming one period nearer in time. This 
leads to (f) Interest cost. That this has to be so is easily seen from the value of an 
€ 100 interest free liability coming to an end at future time t. With interest i, the 
cost of coming one period nearer in time is 100/(1+ i )t-1 – 100/(1+ i  )t which leads 
to the interest cost of 100i/(1+ i )t. Beginning projected benefit obligations is an 
estimate based on earlier set versions of the sort of factors that contribute to the 
determination of elements (e) and (f). These factors are of non-permanent char-
acter, and so, the beginning projected benefit obligations will have to be recal-
culated. This leads to actuarial gains and losses. Due to that we here omit effects 
of not fully known plan assets, else included on the way, the element is simply 
termed (g) Other gains and losses. A simple version of plan amendment is such 
as increasing the promise from 66 percent to 70 percent of salary earned. Plan 
amendments can also be made with effect backwards. The effects of all this are 
found in (h) Plan amendments. 
 
Pension expense  Instead of assembling the primary, underlying elements in 
explaining the period’s flow effect of the funded status, an in-between calcula-
tion of pension expense is made. In addition, this summary item is needed in 
the income statement. Flow items from updating projected benefit obligations, 
(e), (f) and (h), are included in pension expense. In addition to this come ele-
ments from the updating of plan assets, that is, (a) Net earnings on investment 
and (c) Employee contribution.  
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Funded status (over-/under-coverage)  Now, the updating of the funded 
status is fairly simple. The income effects of Pension expense and Other gains 
and losses are netted with the Employer’s contribution. Pension expense ends 
up in the income statement. For Other gains and losses, we have in addition to 
ending up in the income statement, the smoothing alternatives as discussed. In 
Exhibit 4, this is suggested down to the right. 
 
Summary items are included in financial statements, and the details on primary, 
underlying elements are shown in notes. In notes, this is not done in a bird’s eye 
manner as in Exhibit 4, but in several separate charts. So far, it is not difficult to 
see that the effects of including employee benefit plans in financial statements 
can be massively non-neutral. An answer to this is that the meaning of pension 
accounting is just to show effects, massive or not. On the other hand, we have 
the question of what all this does to the reported picture of a business. In the 
next section, this question is addressed.  
 
5.  Effects of pension accounting 
 
Organizing a business means bundling inputs with a perspective that is typically 
non-spontaneous. The purpose is value creation, and in this it is believed to ex-
ist some sort of sufficient willingness to pay for output. Of course, in organizing, 
the effort of people is important. A business is much more than an output-pro-
ducing machine. Infrastructures are input factors that adopt a more permanent 
character, and in this respect physical infrastructures resemble those of output-
producing machines. However, in addition to this we have organizational infra-
structures. In the upper part of Exhibit 5, a bird’s view of this is offered.  
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Exhibit 5: Two processes, the business and  
employee benefit plan processes. 
 
In the lower part of the illustration, processes of employee benefit plans are in-
cluded. Of course, such plans are part of what has to do with organizing an 
enterprise. As any activity of importance, we may see processes associated with 
benefit plans as separate activities with effects of interest. However, it is appar-
ent that benefit plans are different from business processes in not having an 
output with which an explicit willingness to pay is associated. What is associated 
with a benefit plan are stock and flow items included in financial statements 
that reflect the plan status. The purpose is simply to show what is the added 
effect of this, non-neutral or not.  
 
Financial accounting is a long-established device in summarizing what goes on 
in a business. That is, to keep track of value creation processes and what the 
business idea gives. Traditionally, consolidation/aggregation is part of this so 
that the entirety of the business is revealed. The idea behind pension accounting 
is to contribute to this in making the picture reported presumably more correct. 
However, the question is whether this is the case. In practicing pension account-
ing, the picture of what are core activities of a business is most likely distorted. 
In the following we take a look on this.  
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Volatility  In most kind of cases, uncertainty is present. In financial reporting, 
this means that what has been reported does not necessarily repeat. The future 
contributes with surprises in form of “good news” or “bad news” (“neutral news” 
is in addition an eventuality). If the future is seen as a likely path, what later is 
manifest will typically deviate from this reference path. Uncertainty is a likely 
explanation, and time-series characterized by this are said to be volatile. Volati-
lity leads to that predictions are less than exactly precise, and this can be more 
or less so. With pension accounting, added uncertainty is brought into reported 
numbers. That this is so is easily seen from the primary, underlying elements 
introduced in connection with Exhibit 4. In a contribution by Dichev (2008), it 
is documented that accounting numbers over time are more volatile. This may 
well be a result of else well-meant standard setting such as pension accounting. 
In itself this is not of good. Obviously, for increased uncertainty to be traded off, 
increased relevance due to pension accounting is needed. 
 
Financial Analysis  Information financially reported should be reliable and 
relevant. Relevance is two-sided in that we have both the accounting for stew-
ardship point of view, and the question of usefulness as to the resource alloca-
tion problem of users. Analyses of financial statements play a role in this, and 
traditionally, solidity and profitability is something that is focused on. Pension 
accounting makes this less straightforward.  
 
Solidity  In financing an enterprise, the distinction between equity and debt is 
central. Equity is what owners have paid in of capital, in addition to what is re-
tained of earnings. Debts are liabilities, and ordinarily nominally fixed amounts 
(money items) with a given maturity and an agreed on payment of interest. 
Traditionally, as percent of what the balance sheet sums up to, equity is seen to 
signal solidity. The equity ratio says something about exposure to the burden of 
debt. With including effects of employee benefit plans, this is upset. Given 
under-coverage, an interest free pension liability, not nominally fixed, is intro-
duced to the balance sheet. Maturity is less specific or even outright unclear. 
Equity is correspondingly reduced so that solidity is reduced. This leads to a 
question of whether the burden of debt is increased to the same extent, and so 
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the question of relevance. In any case, there are no immediate cash flow effects 
of this. Given over-coverage, the situation turned around.  
 
Profitability  This is measured absolutely, in addition to relatively, typically by 
return on equity (ROE). Of course, as associated with the business value crea-
tion process, this is something that is of critical interest. Pension expense and 
other pension accounting flow items, have a less direct relationship with the 
business value creation process. When included in the income statement, the 
question of relevance is raised. In addition, with less relevant equity measure-
ment, ROE is made less interesting.  
 
6.  A case study 
 
Case studies are important in illuminating effects. When effects repeat, the “case 
of one” problem is less important. Our case study is based on a prominent social 
science institute with distinctive pension accounting effects in annual reports. 
The institution focused, Institute for Social Research (ISR), was established as 
an independent non-commercial foundation in 1950 and has played an im-
portant role in social science research in Norway. More about ISR is found in 
http://www.socialresearch.no/About-us. The ISR case was first drafted as part 
of Lundesgaard (2014) where it is one out of seven case studies.  
 
The employees of ISR have the state Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund as 
organizer of their pension arrangements. The arrangements are favorable defin-
ed benefit plans. As sponsor, and from 2003 on, ISR includes pension effects in 
financial reporting according to NRS 6. Over the years focused, the activity level 
of ISR has been fairly stable and this makes it more easy to see effects pension 
accounting. The activity of ISR is advanced and specialized social science re-
search. A well-qualified core of research faculty is, and has to be in place. In or-
ganizing this, some farsightedness is needed, and this all leads to fixed costs. If 
the access to means is not correspondingly long-term, one is faced with a con-
stant need to succeed with projects. That is the kind of situation ISR finds itself 
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in, and it means that the “bottom line” is very much a result of income uncer-
tainty. In facing uncertainty, independence is secured in owning important 
parts of the physical infrastructure such as buildings, in having “money in the 
bank,” and in being close to debt free. In the first annual report for 2002 
studied, just that is what characterizes the picture presented of ISR. In Exhibit 
6, summaries of the income statement and the balance sheet for 2002 are 
included. For this year, the equity ratio is impressing 73.98 percent.  
 
 
 
Exhibit 6: The last financial statements of ISR not based 
on pension accounting (numbers are in kroner). 
 
After 10 years of pension accounting the equity ratio is down to 29.94 percent, 
and seemingly, ISR is in a very different situation. In reporting, ISR is not speci-
fic on the background for starting with pension accounting from 2003 on. How-
ever, in Note 6 of the 2002 annual report, the following is found (translation by 
the author).  
 
The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund has advanced a claim 
of kr. 7,600,000.–; insufficient employer contribution from 1997 
on to 2001 included, in addition to 14.1% payroll tax, in total kr. 
Income statement aa2002
Revenue 34 968 889
Operating expenses * -33 357 084
Pension expense  ** -1 527 996
Operating result 83 809
Other profit/loss items 790 069
Net profit or loss for the year 873 878
Balance sheet
Fixed assets 5 615 000
Current assets 16 637 486
Sum assets 22 252 486
Equity 16 462 304
Pension liabilities - - - -   
Other liabilities 5 790 182
Sum equity and liabilities 22 252 486
* Exclusive pension expense.
** Equal to the employer's contribution.
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8,671,600.–. Is to be refunded over a period of 5 years from Janu-
ary 1 2003. Institute for Social Research is opposing the claim.   
 
In starting with pension accounting from 2003 on, it is obvious that ISR was 
less successful in opposing the claim forwarded. This is a likely explanation for 
ISR’s conversion to pension accounting, rather than NASB’s constant effort in 
expanding what NRS 6 applies to (such as including institutions like ISR). Based 
on income statements, balance sheets, and notes reported, reworked statements 
of ISR are presented in Exhibit 7. In reworking, statements are made more con-
solidated/aggregated, in addition to that pension expense and pension liabilities 
are shown.  
 
 
Exhibit 7: ISR’s financial reporting 2003-2012 (numbers  
are in kroner) in practicing pension accounting. 
Income statements aa2003 aa2004 aa2005 aa2006 aa2007
Revenue 39 470 388 36 314 284 38 916 549 38 284 428 41 836 539
Operating expenses * -36 738 021 -33 125 774 -36 502 750 -36 639 260 -38 281 801
Pension expense 226 211 -3 017 421 -2 217 781 -1 668 238 -4 535 276
Operating result 2 958 578 171 089 196 018 -23 070 -980 538
Other profit/loss items 669 970 256 810 319 310 523 445 716 883
Net profit or loss for the year 3 628 548 427 899 515 328 500 375 -263 655
Balance sheets
Fixed assets 5 226 500 4 948 000 4 786 500 4 571 000 4 429 170
Current assets 18 830 177 17 749 563 22 277 672 22 055 163 22 035 116
Sum assets 24 056 677 22 697 563 27 064 172 26 626 163 26 464 286
Equity 9 740 053 10 167 952 13 423 585 13 923 960 13 660 306
Pension liabilities 7 427 910 1 547 776 1 547 776 1 547 776 4 467 681
Other liabilities 6 888 714 10 981 835 12 092 811 11 154 427 8 336 299
Sum equity and liabilities 24 056 677 22 697 563 27 064 172 26 626 163 26 464 286
Income statements aa2008 aa2009 aa2010 aa2011 aa2012
Revenue 43 680 590 59 289 080 56 546 766 56 651 736 66 689 649
Operating expenses * -40 637 007 -54 913 720 -53 923 091 -58 320 800 -62 227 878
Pension expense -5 013 827 0 -418 404 -1 238 371 -4 324 097
Operating result -1 970 244 4 375 360 2 205 271 -2 907 435 137 674
Other profit/loss items 1 173 962 -1 133 146 -696 056 426 174 1 387 703
Net profit or loss for the year -796 282 3 242 214 1 509 215 -2 481 261 1 525 377
Balance sheets
Fixed assets 4 240 000 21 437 000 20 992 000 21 600 400 21 301 033
Current assets 30 830 540 23 692 132 21 115 041 27 218 585 34 341 743
Sum assets 35 070 540 45 129 132 42 107 041 48 818 985 55 642 776
Equity 12 864 024 16 106 237 17 615 452 15 134 191 16 659 568
Pension liabilities 9 751 316 10 240 771 12 946 144 13 041 035 15 465 936
Other liabilities 12 455 200 18 782 123 11 545 445 20 643 759 23 517 271
Sum equity and liabilities 35 070 540 45 129 131 42 107 041 48 818 985 55 642 775
* Exclusive pension expense.
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Over the period, pension expense is a rather erratic figure. The zero pension ex-
pense in 2009 is special, and it is difficult to see how this comes about from 
what is reported. Volatility in pension expense leads to volatility in the operating 
result and in the “bottom line” (net profit or loss for the year). In calculating 
these items as percentages of revenue, we have a relative measure of variation in 
figures over time. This leads to the following time-series (percentage operating 
result/percentage “bottom line”). 
 
 
 
Taking this at face value, profitability is something that jumps up and down all 
the way. Of course, it is of interest to see whether this in fact is so for the core 
activity of ISR. Revenues minus operating expenses, leads to a simple measure 
of absolute operational contribution. Calculating this as percentage of revenue, 
leads a time-series that is less erratic. 
 
 
 
The conclusion is that pension accounting makes the “bottom lines” of the in-
come statement less interesting from a practical point of view, or even worthless 
as an indicator of achievement.  
 
For 2004, 2005 and 2006, pension liabilities are included with the same mode-
rate amounts, and this is left uncommented in annual reports. However, ISR is 
practicing the “corridor approach,” so what is pointed to may have something to 
do with this. Apart from these years, we find that pension liabilities are included 
with figures that really count. In any case, seen over the period, the balance 
sheet effects of pension accounting are important. In starting out in 2003, the 
effect is massive for this year. For the period studied, the equity ratio is the fol-
lowing. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
7.50/9.19 0.47/1.18 0.50/1.32 -0.06/1.31 -2.34/-0.63 -4.51/-1.82 7.38/5.47 3.90/2.67 -5.13/-4.38 0.21/2.29
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
6.92 8.78 6.20 4.30 8.50 6.97 7.38 4.64 -2.95 6.69
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To begin with in 2002, the economic situation of ISR is good. Over the period 
with pension accounting, this has in reality also been very much the so. Nev-
ertheless, seen traditionally, the picture reported looks rather desolate. In the 
balance sheets presented, ISR looks considerably less solid than what really is 
the case. The good economic situation, and the practicing of the “corridor ap-
proach,” is what made it possible to escape ending up with negative equity. In 
Note 4 of the 2012 annual report, it is said that the total of pension liabilities, 
payroll tax included, is kr. 26,471,883. Due to the “corridor approach,” what 
is in the balance sheet is kr. 15,465,936. The permitted “backlog” set aside, an 
equity ratio around 10 percent is what this leads to.  
 
7.  What is more meaningful, reporting limited to notes? 
 
In studies of financial accounting, orientations are typically framed as either 
positive or normative. This, even though, the distinction is not necessarily 
hundred percent dichotomous. Anyway, in academia as to what is presti-
gious, the tendency over years has been strong in direction of the positive 
accounting orientation. An observation on this by Jiang and Penman 
(2013:234) is that “[r]esearchers are sometimes advised to avoid normative 
statements on accounting policy, but to deny this mission would be akin to 
medical school that has no interest in healing patients.” As pointed to, the 
problem of what financial reporting regulation should look like is ever pre-
sent, and a normative problem. To the extent that academia shies away, this 
is something that lawmakers, standard setters, and concerned practitioners 
and others are left alone with. Or, we may say, it is left more or less up to the 
politics of financial reporting regulation. 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
40.49 44.80 49.60 52.29 51.62 36.68 35.69 41.83 31.00 29.94
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Financial reporting has to do with information, and what is regulated is the 
structure of this in financial reports. In general, what is reported on is com-
plex. So, in forming regulation, one is faced with a multitude of difficult 
trade-offs. However, what makes this still more difficult is the lack of consen-
sus even on fundamentals. How points of view are distributed is not a simple 
question to answer, even if Glover (2014), Macve (2014) and Zeff (2014) are 
of help in this. Thus, let us concentrate on what the opposing fundamentals 
are.  
 
     The classical, income statement approach  In this appro-
ach, absolute profitability measurement is essential, and the core 
principles guiding this are framed as income statement matching. 
Measurement is to a certain extent transaction historical cost 
(THC/original cost) based, so that the balance sheet is accumulat-
ing “expenses in the waiting line.”  
 
     The balance sheet approach  In this approach, a balance 
sheet being the consequence of the classical approach is a prob-
lem. Instead of classical matching, balance sheet matching of as-
sets and liabilities is seen as more fundamental. That is, a sort of 
matching that leads to equity, and next to the period’s increment 
in equity. What is particularly important, however, is that THC is 
abandoned and replaced with fair value accounting as far as pos-
sible.  
 
The Norwegian Accounting Act of 1998 is based on the income statement ap-
proach, and is THC based. The foundations of IFRS administered by IASB, 
and so also FASB’s approach to regulation, are based on the balance sheet 
approach. In addition, it is right to say that the two main standard setters 
have been widely open to including fair value accounting in their standards. 
Impairment is an example of why fair value, understood as a hypothetical 
market value, should play a role in accounting. This is an example of sorts of 
mixing of approaches that has long-standing meaning. However, this has less 
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to do with adopting approaches as outlined, in a consequential manner. It is 
an observation that standard setters have not been consequential. Regulation 
based on mixing types of approach is a problem. FASB and IASB have been 
working hard in direction of the balance sheet orientation since the 1970s. 
Most eminently this is seen in conceptual frameworks, see the SFACs from 
FASB (some are referred to) and IASB (1989/2013). So far, this has led to 
very voluminous standards, and to standards that are clearly unstable. Of 
course, this is not of good.  
 
A seemingly obvious foundation for NASB’s work with national standards is 
to base this on the principles stated in the national accounting act. That is, on 
classical approaches to financial accounting. However, less energy has been 
allocated to this due to the momentum of IFRS. NRS 6 on pension accounting 
is one example of how, at an early stage, elements of IFRS are brought into 
national regulation on financial reporting. With pension expenses, elements 
that have to do with processes of employee benefit plans are brought into the 
income statement. These are elements that have a more distant relationship 
to the value creation process of a business. The effects of this can be massive, 
as we have seen in the case study included in Section 6. Bottom lines are 
made less relevant and less reliable. Simply, earnings quality is reduced, and 
this may well be so to a considerable degree. With pension accounting, the 
balance sheet is upset and disturbed as we have seen in the case study. The 
balance is no longer a “Norwegian balance” based on classical foundations. 
With NRS 6, and for the reporting entities the standard applies to, the bal-
ance sheet includes a mix of THC / fair value types of items. The meaning of 
this is unclear, and this is sometimes referred to as the problem of mismatch. 
This all is a result of a misguided desire to see the two processes in Exhibit 5 
as one, in spite of that mismatch is not of good.  
 
The lack of consensus on fundamentals is already referred to, and positions 
taken can sometimes lead to heated exchange of points of view. Most likely, 
the explanation for this has to do with the complexity of the reporting prob-
lem. An answer to this could be to go to the users of financial reports. That is, 
 - 24 - 
 
 
 
 
 
such as to analysts having a professional interest in how financial reports are 
worked out. However, as Jiang and Penman (2013:235) point to this is not 
that simple. 
 
Indeed, the accounting Boards [such as FASB og IASB] have been 
very keen to get the opinions of analysts. It appears, however, that 
this approach does not elicit clear recommendations. For example, 
the leadership of the CFA Institute [stands for Chartered Financial 
Analyst Institute being a worldwide organization of analysts with 
its seat in Charlottesville, Virginia (USA)] has come out strongly in 
favor of fair value accounting, while rank-and-file working analysts 
seem to have a different opinion. The Boards’ recent insurance 
proposals have been controversial among analysts, some endor-
sement (largely in Europe) and some strong opposition (largely in 
the US). We suspect the reason is that analysts use accounting data 
in very different ways; there is no common platform for carrying 
out analysis. 
 
This is rather depressing, and is why financial statement analysis is seen 
more as an art, rather than a science based discipline. However, as again 
pointed to by Jiang and Penman (2013), as an alternative to all this, residual 
income valuation (RIV) is an approach to analysis. The foundations of RIV 
are firmly anchored in fundamentals of financial accounting and economics 
of business. Stephen Penman has been important in doing work on this sum-
marized in Penman (2011/2013). In Lundesgaard (2012), this is taken advan-
tage of. In RIV, it is easy to see how both the income statement and the bal-
ance sheet play a role. So, it leads astray to accentuate one before the other. 
Important is that RIV lends meaning to THC, and thus, to income statement 
matching. The balance sheet that is a result of this is important for RIV. Fair 
value accounting destroys all this.  
 
To start with in Section 7, two opposed positions on the foundations of regu-
lation were introduced. Above, RIV is pointed to as something else. In this, it 
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is interesting that pension accounting has been argued for in taking advant-
age of each of the opposed positions. In commenting on this, Kvaal and Sel-
læg (2003:46) are starting out as included in what follows (freely translated 
by the author). 
 
Pension accounting is justified in referring to the matching prin-
ciple (such as in NRS 6 [....]), or in referring to the definition of 
liabilities in conceptual frameworks (such as in IAS 19). In taking 
advantage of a simple example, the ideas behind this are pre-
sented. Funding and discounting are assumed away. We look at a 
project employing one person over five years. The employee starts 
out with the salary of 100 per year. In addition, the understanding 
includes employee benefits equal to last year’s salary to be paid out 
when the employment period is ended. Obviously, from a matching 
point of view a relevant part of the benefit obligation should be in-
cluded in payroll expenses of the first year. The relevant part refer-
red to is part of the employee’s compensation for work rendered. 
Correspondingly, this leads to the necessity of including a relevant 
part of future benefit obligations as a pension liability so that liabi-
lities accumulated are shown. From both points of view, it seems 
reasonable to approach the problem of distributing the benefit 
obligation over the period in doing this in an even manner. Now, in 
assuming a benefit obligation equal to first year’s salary, this leads 
to the pension expense of 100/5 = 20. This is both the first year’s 
pension expense and what is included in the balance sheet as pen-
sion liability.  
 
Remarkably, the point of departure does not matter. In any case, the effects 
of employee benefit plans should be included in financial statements. This 
may explain why, in Norway, pension accounting after all has been intro-
duced without that much fuzz. The volatility problem is simply swept under 
the carpet with the even out argument.  
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It is of good that foundations are discussed. In financial accounting, however, 
it is difficult to free oneself from the impression of some sort of impasse, or 
dead end. Pension accounting is something we see in practice. So, asking the 
question of what this all looks like in practice may bring us ahead. That is 
what is done in Section 6 with the ISR case. Of course, this may well prompt 
accusations in direction of being anecdotal. On the other hand, when faulty 
outcome is observed, it is not necessarily so that particularly advanced inves-
tigations are needed to identify what is the problem. To begin with in Section 
1, it was stated that it is not necessarily so that the effects of employee benefit 
plans are to be made visible in including effects in financial statements. The 
problem with including effects is that the reported picture of the business 
process is garbled. Nevertheless, all what has to do with effects of employee 
benefit plans is still of interest. However, information on this may as well be 
limited to notes, or otherwise reported. This is what is believed to be a solu-
tion to what is identified as a problem. Based on financial statements the 
business process can be analyzed un-garbled. In a second round, the effects of 
employee benefit plans can be taken into account in analyzing the company 
in its entirety. It is not given that today’s reporting in notes is sufficiently 
good for this. In any case, this is something that users, as well as producers, 
are struggling with. In facing what is identified as a fundamental problem of 
pension accounting, or not, the standard setter is advised to address the 
question of what is in the notes.  
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